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ABSTRACT
This paper compares two contrasting approaches to robust monetary policy design. 
The first developed by Hansen and Sargent (2003, 2007) assumes unstructured 
model uncertainty and uses a minimax robustness criterion to design monetary rules. 
This contrasts with an older literature that structures uncertainty by seeking rules 
that are robust across competing views of the economy. This paper carries out and 
compares robust design exercises using both approaches using a standard ‘canonical 
New Keynesian model’. We pay particular attention to a number of issues: First, we 
distinguish three possible forms of the implied game between malign nature and the 
policymaker in the Hansen-Sargent procedure. Second, in both approaches, we 
examine the consequences for robust rules of the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint 
on the nominal interest rate, the monetary instrument. Finally, again for both types of 
robustness exercise we explore the implications of policy design when the 
policymaker is obliged to use simple Taylor-type interest rate rules. 
Keywords: robustness, structured and unstructured uncertainty, zero lower bound 
interest rate constraint 
JEL Classification: E52, E37, E58 5
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Non-Technical Summary
This paper compares two contrasting approaches to robust monetary policy design in
the face of model uncertainty. The ﬁrst developed by Hansen and Sargent (2003, 2007)
assumes unstructured uncertainty and uses a minimax robustness criterion to design mon-
etary rules. It has three key ingredients that distinguishes it from alternatives. First, it
conducts ‘local analysis’ in the sense that it assumes that the true model is known only up
to some local neighbourhood of models that surround the ‘approximating’ or ‘core’ model.
Second, it uses a minimax criterion without priors in model space. Third, the type of
uncertainty is both unstructured and additive being reﬂected in additive shock processes
that are ‘chosen’ by malevolent nature to feed back on state variables so has to maximize
the loss function the policy-maker is trying to minimize.
The Hansen-Sargent (henceforth HS) minimax criterion for robust design contrasts
with an older literature that structures uncertainty in a number of ways. The general
feature of this approach is to seek rules that are robust across competing views of the
economy. These could be competing and possibly quite diﬀerent structural models or the
same structural model, but with diﬀerent parameter values.
This paper carries out and compares robust design exercises using both approaches
using a standard ‘canonical New Keynesian model’. We pay particular attention to a
number of issues: First, we distinguish three possible forms of the implied game between
malign nature and the policymaker in the HS procedure. Second, in both approaches,
we examine the consequences for robust rules of the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint
on the nominal interest rate, the monetary instrument. Finally, again for both types of
robustness exercises we explore the implications of policy design when the policymaker is
obliged to use simple Taylor-type interest rate rules.
Our results can be summarized as follows: First, the HS robust policy calls for a more
aggressive monetary response to shocks than in the absence of model uncertainty. This
is not a new result but we pursue an important consequence of this feature that has not
appeared in the literature. A high interest rate variability in both the worst-case and
approximating equilibria means that, in both scenarios, the robust rule leads to a serious
violation of the ZLB constraint. The latter can be taken into account by choosing a
steady state inﬂation rate suﬃciently large, but then the costs of achieving robustness are
substantial.
Second, HS robust control can be seen as a non-cooperative game between malign
nature and the policymaker. As in any game, the equilibrium concept needs close atten-
tion. In most applications of HS the latter is an open-loop Nash equilibrium. We argue6
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that this is not always a minimax solution as the policymaker who can commit can do
better in the face of the worst environment by anticipating nature’s strategy and acting
as a leader. However if commitment is not possible and the policymakers exercises discre-
tion, the worst-case equilibrium deteriorates sharply and with it the cost of robustness.
A combination of an inability to commit and the ZLB constraint imposes a substantial
welfare cost mainly driven by a high steady state inﬂation rate for both the worst-case
and approximating equilibria.
There are other question marks against the HS approach to robustness. As Svensson
(2000) has argued, the worst-case outcome is going to be a very low probability event
and from any Bayesian perspective it is inappropriate to design policy that is so heavily
inﬂuenced by it. HS robust control is appropriate if little information is available on the
underlying uncertainty facing the policymaker, originating from the model or the manner
in which agents form expectations. But is this really the case with respect to the eﬀect
of particular monetary rules on the macro-economy? Central banks devote considerable
resources to this end in their assessment of the forecasting properties of the approximating
model, those of rival models and estimates of parameter uncertainty gleaned from various
estimation methods. To then fail to fully utilize the fruits of this exercise seems both
incongruous and a counsel of despair.
In the ﬁnal section of the paper we set out a general Bayesian framework for using
the information available for the design of commitment interest rate rules. Again we
incorporate a ZLB constraint in construction of our robust rules, but in notable contrast
with HS robustness the Bayesian approach does not result in aggressive monetary responses
to shocks and a high interest rate volatility. It follows that the steady state inﬂation rate
required to impose the ZLB in an optimal fashion is very low, and in fact we conﬁne
ourselves to slightly sub-optimal rules where it remains at zero.
In our Bayesian exercise we conﬁne ourselves to a very simple form of structured un-
certainty surrounding one important parameter capturing the degree of price stickiness.
We compare a robust interest rate rule that is optimal in the absence of any model un-
certainty, with a simple rule feeding back on current inﬂation. We ﬁnd that simple rules
designed for one model implemented in the wrong model are far more robust than its
optimal counterpart. This in a sense is an additional argument for simple rules to be
considered alongside their transparency and ease of implementation. However when both
types of rules are designed to be robust across the possible views of the world, this ad-
vantage of simplicity disappears. Nevertheless this exercise suggests that some types of
rule may be more robust than others and robust design using a Bayesian approach should
investigate a range of rules with that in mind.7
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1 Introduction
This paper compares two contrasting approaches to robust monetary policy design in the
face of model uncertainty. The ﬁrst developed by Hansen and Sargent (2003), Hansen and
Sargent (2007) assumes unstructured uncertainty and uses a minimax robustness criterion
to design monetary rules. It has three key ingredients that distinguishes it from alterna-
tives. First, it conducts ‘local analysis’ in the sense that it assumes that the true model is
known only up to some local neighbourhood of models that surround the ‘approximating’
or ‘core’ model. Second, it uses a minimax criterion without priors in model space. Third,
the type of uncertainty is both unstructured and additive being reﬂected in additive shock
processes that are ‘chosen’ by malevolent nature to feed back on state variables so has to
maximize the loss function the policy-maker is trying to minimize.
The Hansen-Sargent (henceforth HS) minimax criterion for robust design contrasts
with an older literature that structures uncertainty in a number of ways. The general
feature of this approach is to seek rules that are robust across competing views of the
economy. These could be competing and possibly quite diﬀerent structural models (see,
for example, Levin et al. (2003), Coenen (2007)) or the same structural model, but with
diﬀerent parameter values. The latter could be draws from an estimated joint distribution
of parameters, (see Batini et al. (2006)). The latter combines these forms of competing
models using Bayesian methods to estimate both the distribution and the model proba-
bilities.
This paper carries out and compares robust design exercises using both approaches
using a standard ‘canonical New Keynesian model’. We pay particular attention to a
number of issues: First, we distinguish three possible forms of the implied game between
malign nature and the policymaker in the HS procedure. Second, in both approaches,
we examine the consequences for robust rules of the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint
on the nominal interest rate, the monetary instrument. Finally, again for both types of
robustness exercises we explore the implications of policy design when the policymaker is
obliged to use simple Taylor-type interest rate rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
sets out the general procedure for HS robust control and then applies the method to our
chosen model. Section 4 addresses concerns for the interest rate ZLB constraint. Section8
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5 conducts a parallel rival models exercise and Section 6 concludes.
2 Optimal Policy without Model Uncertainty
2.1 The Model
The New Keynesian model we employ is now standard in the monetary policy literature.
In a linearized form in the vicinity of a no-growth zero-inﬂation steady state it consists of a
Keynes-Ramsey equation for consumption behaviour, (4) below with output equal to con-
sumption in the absence of capital, investment and government spending, and a Phillips
curve based on Calvo-type price setting for ﬁrms, (5). There are three exogenous shocks:
technology, mark-up and preference shocks, (1)–(3). Below we provides a summary of the
notation used throughout the paper.
πt producer price inﬂation over interval [t − 1,t]
it nominal interest rate over interval [t,t +1 ]
mct marginal cost
yt,ˆ yt output with sticky prices and ﬂexi-prices
lt employment
rt expected real interest rate
ot =ˆ yt − yt output gap
at+1 = ρaat +  a,t+1 AR(1) process for factor productivity shock, at
et+1 = ρeet +  e,t+1 AR(1) process for mark-up shock, et
uC,t+1 = ρCgt +  C,t+1 AR(1) process for preference, uC,t
β discount parameter
1 − ξ probability of a price re-optimization
σ risk-aversion parameter
φ disutility of labour supply parameter
ζ elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods
Summary of Notation (Variables in Deviation Form)9
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at+1 = ρaat +  a,t+1 (1)
et+1 = ρeet +  e,t+1 (2)
uC,t+1 = ρCuC,t +  C,t+1 (3)
Etyt+1 = yt +
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 + EtuC,t+1 − uC,t)( 4 )
βEtπt+1 = πt − λmct − et (5)
mct =( σ + φ)yt − (1 + φ)at (6)
lt = yt − at (7)
rt = it − Etπt+1 (8)
ˆ yt =
 
1+φ
σ + φ
 
at (9)
ot =ˆ yt − yt (10)
where
λ =
(1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)
ξ
(11)
We choose a loss function that corresponds to the welfare-based quadratic form in
Woodford (2003).
Wt =
1
2
 
(σ + φ)o2
t + wππ2
t + wii2
t
 
+ t.i.p (12)
where wπ =
ζ
λ. For a quarterly model, parameter values chosen are σ =2 ,β =0 .99,
ξ = 2
3 (corresponding to an average price contract of 3 quarters), φ =1 .7, ζ =7 .67
(corresponding to a 15% price mark-up), ρa = ρC =0 .7, ρe =0 .35, and sd( i)=1 .0,
i = a,C,e. In the absence of any constraint on the nominal interest rate we put wi =0 .10
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We can write this system in state space form as
⎡
⎣
zt+1
Etxt+1
⎤
⎦ = A
⎡
⎣
zt
xt
⎤
⎦ + Bit + C
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
 a,t+1
 e,t+1
 C,t+1
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
(13)
st =
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
mct
yt
lt
rt
ot
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
= E
⎡
⎣ zt
xt
⎤
⎦ ≡ Eyt (14)
Wt =
1
2
[y 
tQyt +2 y 
tUit + Ri2
t] (15)
where zt =[ at,e t,u C,t]  is a vector of predetermined variables, xt =[ yt,π t]  is a vector of
non-predetermined or ‘jump’ variables, and st is vector of outputs of interest. Throughout
we assume ‘complete information’ on the part of economic agents: i.e., rational expecta-
tions are formed assuming an information set {zs,xs,  a,s,  a,e,  C,s}, s ≤ t, the model and
the monetary rule. The chosen instrument is the nominal interest rate, it.
2.2 Optimal Policy with and without Commitment
We now examine three monetary policy regimes. The ﬁrst is the ex ante optimal policy
(OP) which is time inconsistent and can only be reached if the policymaker can commit.
For the most general linear-quadratic problem, this is found at time t = 0 by minimizing
with respect to the interest rate path {it} the inter-temporal conditional welfare loss
Ω0 =( 1− β)Et
 
∞  
t=0
βtWt
 
(16)
subject to the model (13) and (14), initial conditions z(0), terminal conditions for x and
the variance-covariance matrix cov( t).
To evaluate the discretionary, time-consistent policy (D) we write the expected loss Ωt
at time t as
Ωt = Et
 
(1 − β)
∞  
τ=t
βτ−tWτ
 
=( 1− β)Wt + βΩt+1
The dynamic programming solution then seeks a stationary solution of the form it = −Fzt,
Ωt = z 
tSzt and xt = −Nzt where matrices S and N are now of dimensions (n − m) ×11
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(n − m)a n dm × (n − m) respectively, in which Ωt is minimized at time t subject to (1)
in the knowledge that a similar procedure will be used to minimize Ωt+1 at time t +1 . 1
Both the instrument it and the forward-looking variables xt are now proportional to the
predetermined component of the state-vector zt and the equilibrium we seek is therefore
Markov Perfect. In Appendix A.2 we set out an iterative process for Ft, Nt,a n dSt starting
with some initial values. If the process converges to stationary values independent of these
initial values,2 F, N and S say, then the time-consistent feedback rule is it = −Fzt.
Our third rule is a Taylor-type simple rule (TR) constrained to be of the form
it = ρit−1 + θππt + θy(yt − ˆ yt) (17)
The policymaker then maximizes the expected conditional welfare loss Ω0 with respect to
feedback parameters ρ,θπ,θ y given the model, initial conditions z(0), terminal conditions
for x and the variance-covariance matrix cov( t). Unlike policy rules OP and D, the optimal
form of TR is not certainty equivalent and depends on both z(0) and cov( t).
General procedures for calculating these three policy rules are set out in the Appendix.
Analytical results for our NK model for the more general robust policy rules are provided
in section 3.4. Numerical results, given our calibration, are provided in table 1. This
table provides conditional (asymptotic) variances and the expected conditional welfare
loss in the vicinity of the steady state; i.e., we put z(0) = 0 and, in eﬀect, only study the
stochastic optimization problem, a feature of all our results.3 The table also gives two
further useful properties of these rules: ﬁrst, the probability of the interest rate hitting
the zero lower bound in the vicinity of the steady state, equal to the probability of the
standard normal variable z> I
sd(it),w h e r eI = 1
β − 1 is the steady state interest rate;4
second, the welfare loss associated with the two sub-optimal policies D and TR measured
in terms of a permanent percentage fall in consumption at the steady state given by5
(ΩOP − Ωi) × 10−2 ; i = D,TR
1See Currie and Levine (1993) and S¨ oderlind (1999).
2Indeed we ﬁnd this is the case in the results reported in the paper.
3The ‘timeless perspective’ (set out in Appendix A.1.2) is then irrelevant for this choice of welfare
criterion.
4With β =0 .99, I =1 .01% or about 4% per year.
5See Levine et al. (2007).12
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A number of features are worth noting at this stage. First, the optimized Taylor rule
comes very close to mimicking the fully optimal policy with only a consumption equiva-
lent cost of ce =0 .001%. The optimized parameters imply an integral rule with a strong
feedback from inﬂation, but a modest one from the output gap. Second, the gains from
commitment measured as the diﬀerence between OP and D are small at ce =0 .007%. The
reported variances indicate that these costs take the form of higher output gap and inﬂa-
tion volatilities. Third, the asymptotic variance of interest rate is very high in all cases
implying a probability of hitting the ZLB of just over a quarter for the two commitment
rules, rising to almost a third for discretion. This feature of the optimal policy is clearly
unrealistic, but we defer a discussion of this point to section 4 where we impose a ZLB
constraint.
Optimal (OP) Discretion (D) Taylor Rule (TR)
var(at) 1.96 1.96 1.96
var(uC,t) 1.96 1.96 1.96
var(et) 1.96 1.96 1.96
var(ot) 1.91 2.23 198
var(πt) 0.03 0.04 0.03
var(yt) 2.95 3.28 2.93
var(lt) 2.05 2.38 2.16
var(rt) 2.15 4.88 2.56
var(it) 2.40 4.60 2.53
Prob. ZLB 0.26 0.32 0.27
Ω0 4.286 4.986 4.356
ce(%) 0 0.007 0.001
Table 1. Volatility and Welfare Outcomes with No Model Uncertainty
Note: For the Taylor rule optimal parameter values are ρ =1 ,θπ =8 .96, θy =0 .06.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses to a mark-up shock. In the absence of a ZLB
constraint, the technology and preference shocks are uninteresting because the output gap13
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and inﬂations are met perfectly and the only variables to respond are the nominal and real
interest rates necessary to meet these targets. For the mark-up shock and for all policy
rules labour supply and therefore output (yt) falls leading to an increase in the output
gap, ot =ˆ yt−yt. The mark-up shock directly increases inﬂation and the policy response is
to raise the nominal interest by considerably more, so that both the ex ante and expected
real interest rate rises. Output then is depressed reducing marginal costs and oﬀsetting the
eﬀect of the mark-up shock. The ﬁgures indicates that the optimized Taylor rule almost
exactly mimics the fully optimal rule, but under discretion the responses of the labour
supply, the output gap, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are all more exaggerated.
The reason for this is that in the absence of a commitment mechanism, the promise under
commitment to ﬁrst raise inﬂation then lower it below the steady state lacks credibility.
With discretion, the interest rate then lacks the same ability to inﬂuence demand in any
one period with the result that the initial hike is much greater.
3 Robust Rules with Unstructured Model Uncertainty
3.1 The Approximating and Disturbed Models
Our approximating model is the model of section 2. The distorted model adds miss-
speciﬁcation errors ut+1 and vt+1 to the Phillips and Euler equations respectively and is
given by
at+1 = ρaat +  a,t+1
et+1 = ρeet +  e,t+1
uC,t+1 = ρCuC,t +  C,t+1
βEtπt+1 = πt − λmct − et − ut+1
Etyt+1 = yt +
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 + EtuC,t+1 − uC,t) − vt+1
mct =( σ + φ)yt − (1 + φ)at
lt = yt − at
rt = it − Etπt+1
ˆ yt =
 
1+φ
σ + φ
 
at
ot =ˆ yt − yt14
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We can again write this system in state space form as
⎡
⎣
zt+1
Etxt+1
⎤
⎦ = A
⎡
⎣
zt
xt
⎤
⎦ + Bit + C
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
 a,t+1
 e,t+1
 C,t+1
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
+ Dˆ wt+1 (18)
st =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣
mct
yt
lt
rt
ot
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎦
= F
⎡
⎣
zt
xt
⎤
⎦ ≡ Fyt (19)
Ω0 = Et
 
1
2
∞  
t=0
βt[y 
tQyt +2 y 
tUit + Ri2
t]
 
(20)
Wt =
1
2
[y 
tQyt +2 y 
tUit + Ri2
t] (21)
3.2 The Hansen-Sargent Robust Controller
The robust policy is then found by assuming that nature chooses ˆ w 
t+1 =[ ut+1 vt+1]  in a
malign fashion so as to maximize Ω0 subject to a constraint on the misspeciﬁed dynamics
given by
 ∞
t=0 βt ˆ w 
t+1 ˆ wt+1 ≤ η. Following HS it is more convenient to reformulate this
constraint problem as a certainty equivalent multiplier problem in which nature maximizes
Λ0 =Ω 0 −
1
2
Θ
∞  
t=0
βtˆ w 
t+1ˆ wt+1 (22)
where Θ is a positive Lagrange multiplier, subject to Θ ∈ [¯ Θ,∞).6 The HS robust con-
troller is then found as a solution to
min
{it}
max
{ˆ wt+1}
Λ0 (23)
To solve the deterministic case of this problem deﬁne a Hamiltonian
Ht = βt  
(y 
tQyt +2 y 
tUit + w 
tRit)+2 βp 
t+1(Ayt + Bit + Dˆ wt+1 − yt+1) − βΘˆ w 
t+1ˆ wt+1)
 
6A simple minimax problem of this form shows that the lower bound on Θ is necessary to ensure
that the inner optimization by nature satisﬁes the second order condition. The parameter Θ is positively
related to the ‘detection probability error probability’ that an econometrician observing the equilibrium
outcome would infer incorrectly that the approximating and worst-case equilibria generate the same data.
See Hansen and Sargent (2007), chapter 9.15
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Then the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to it, yt and ˆ wt+1 respectively are
it = −R−1(βB pt+1 + U yt) (24)
βA pt+1 = pt − (Qyt + Uit) (25)
ˆ wt+1 =
1
Θ
D pt (26)
Together with the original constraint
yt+1 = Ayt + Bit + Dˆ wt+1 (27)
(24) to (27) describes the worst-case equilibrium. By contrast the approximating equilib-
rium is the approximating model (27) with D = 0, i.e.,
ya,t+1 = Aya,t + Bit (28)
but under the robust rule given by wt. Appealing to certainty equivalence the same rules
apply when we add white-noise shocks  t. Then substituting for it and ˆ wt+1 from (24) and
(26) we arrive at the following system describing both the worst-case and approximating
equilibria
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
I 0 βBR−1B 
0 Iβ B R −1B  − 1
ΘDD 
00 β(A  − UR−1B )
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
ya,t+1
yt+1
pt+1
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
=
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
A − BR−1U  00
0 A − BR−1U  0
0 −(Q − UR−1U ) I
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
ya,t
yt
pt
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
+
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
C
C
0
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
 a,t+1
 e,t+1
 C,t+1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
(29)
To complete the solution we require 3n boundary conditions for (29). Specifying
za,0 = z0 gives us 2(n − m) of these conditions. The initial condition for an optimum for
both the policymaker and nature is
p2,0 =0
where p 
t =
 
p 
1,tp 
2,t
 
is partitioned so that p1,t is of dimension (n − m) × 1. This gives us
m more initial conditions. We seek a stable rational expectations solution which imposes
n+m terminal conditions on the forward-looking variables [p 
1,t x 
t x 
a,t], completing the 3n
boundary conditions. As Θ becomes large, robust and non-robust rules will converge.16
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In what follows we treat the parameter Θ as a parameter whose inverse represents the
policymaker’s concern for robustness. Note, however, that robust control in the engineering
literature, from which the work of Hansen and Sargent stems, adopts a slightly diﬀerent
approach from this section and from what follows. Part of the so-called H∞ design is that
‘malign nature’ chooses the value of Θ as low as possible, subject to two criteria being
satisﬁed: (i) the overall system under control is stable (ii) the optimal feedback as designed
to solve the problem yields a stable system when malign nature is switched oﬀ. This is
similar to the approximating model ya,t being stable. However choosing Θ ‘optimally’ can
lead to either the system in (i) or that in (ii) being only just stable. This means that in
the stochastic case, variances can be very high for one of these systems, and this, as we
shall see, raises the probability of the interest rate hitting zero.
3.3 Robust Control as a Game
It is useful to characterize the solution to the robust policy problem in terms of a dynamic
game between the monetary authority and nature. There is a third player in this game,
the private sector forming model-consistent expectations based on the model and the
monetary rule. As with all multi-person games there are a number of possible equilibria
in this game and each leads to a diﬀerent solution to the robust policy problem. We now
consider three possible games, the ﬁrst corresponding to the above robust control solution.
Game 1. This is a two-player zero-sum game with payoﬀs deﬁned by (23). Each
player simultaneously commits to sequences {it} and { ˆ wt+1} at time t = 0 taking the
other players sequence of moves as given. Although the optimal solution can be expressed
as feedback rules it = Dyt and ˆ wt = ˆ Dyt, the game is actually of an open-loop character
because this feed-back is not taken into account in the ﬁrst-order conditions. Since the
players move simultaneously there is no leadership by the monetary authority although
there is commitment with respect to the private sector. We refer to the second game as
the time inconsistent open-loop Nash game.
Game 2. In this paper we wish to study robust simple commitment rules that provide
the best response of the policymaker to the worst possible outcome. The HS robust control
rule above does not achieve this. A robust rule responds to the worst possible shock from
the viewpoint of the authority which requires that nature chooses a sequence for { ˆ wt+1}17
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that is optimal ex ante at time t = 0. The monetary authority anticipates the response
of nature to its commitment rule and so exercises leadership. It then faces an economy
under the malign inﬂuence of nature of the form
⎡
⎣
I 0
0 βA 
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣
yt+1
pt+1
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣
A DD 
Θ
−QI
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣
yt
pt
⎤
⎦ +
⎡
⎣
B
−U
⎤
⎦it
+
⎡
⎣ C
0
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣
 a,t+1
 e,t+1
 C,t+1
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎦
This is in the standard form for designing ex ante optimal policy, discretionary policy and
an optimized Taylor rule as in section 2 and described in general in the Appendix. We
call the ﬁrst of these cases, the time inconsistent Stackelberg game.
Game 3. In this paper we again study the best response of the policymaker to the
worst possible outcome and the monetary authority anticipates the response of nature
to policy so exercises leadership. However the policymaker cannot commit and exercises
discretion, optimizing in each period on the assumption that a re-optimization will occur
in each subsequent period. We refer to this game the time consistent discretionary game.
3.4 Application to the Canonical Keynesian Model
First consider nature’s problem. Again by an appeal to certainty equivalence we can ﬁrst
consider the deterministic problem and assume that the same policy rule applies to the
stochastic case. The former is calculated by setting up the Lagrangian
L =
1
2
∞  
t=0
βt
 
− (σ + φ)o2
t − wππ2
t − wii2
t +Θ ( u2
t+1 + v2
t+1)
+2 ˆ μ1,t+1(ρaat − at+1)+2ˆ μ2,t+1(ρeet − et+1)
+2 ˆ μ3,t+1(ρCuC,t − uC,t+1)+2ˆ μ4,t+1 (πt + λ[(1 + φ)at − (σ + φ)yt] − βπt+1 − et − ut+1)
+2 ˆ μ5,t+1
 
yt +
1
σ
(it − πt+1 +( ρC − 1)uC,t) − yt+1 − vt+1
  
(30)
Nature then chooses {ut+1,v t+1} to maximize (30), given {it}. The ﬁrst order condi-18
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tions for this problem are:
ut+1 :Θ ut+1 − ˆ μ4,t+1 = 0 (31)
vt+1 :Θ vt+1 − ˆ μ5,t+1 = 0 (32)
πt : −wππt +ˆ μ4,t+1 − ˆ μ4,t −
1
σβ
ˆ μ5,t = 0 (33)
yt :( σ + φ)ot − λ(σ + φ)ˆ μ4,t+1 +ˆ μ5,t+1 −
1
β
ˆ μ5,t = 0 (34)
plus foc for the shocks which we do not need, with initial conditions ˆ μ4,0 =ˆ μ5,0 =0 .W e
can now eliminate ˆ μ4,t+1 and ˆ μ5,t+1 from (31) and (32) to obtain the following processes
for nature’s worst misspeciﬁcation errors
Θ
 
ut+1 − ut −
1
σβ
vt
 
= wππt
Θ
 
vt+1 −
1
β
vt − λ(σ + φ)ut+1
 
= −(σ + φ)ot
We can express this system as
K
⎡
⎣
ut+1
vt+1
⎤
⎦ = L
⎡
⎣
ut
vt
⎤
⎦ + M
⎡
⎣
ot
πt
⎤
⎦ (35)
This then expresses the worst-case misspeciﬁcation errors ut and vt of nature as a reaction
to past outcomes [ot−1,o t−2, ··; πt−1,π t−2, ·· ].
3.4.1 Robust Control: Game 1
In this open-loop Nash game the policymaker’s problem is the mirror-image of that of
nature: to choose {it} to minimize the welfare loss for which the Lagrangian is
L =
1
2
∞  
t=0
βt
 
(σ + φ)o2
t + wππ2
t + wii2
t +Θ ( u2
t+1 + v2
t+1)
+2 μ1,t+1(ρaat − at+1)+2 μ2,t+1(ρeet − et+1)
+2 μ3,t+1(ρCuC,t − uC,t+1)+2 μ4,t+1 (πt + λ[(1 + φ)at − (σ + φ)yt] − βπt+1 − et − ut+1)
+2 μ5,t+1
 
yt +
1
σ
(it − πt+1 +( ρC − 1)uC,t) − yt+1 − vt+1
  
given {ut+1},{vt+1}.19
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The foc for this problem are
it : wiit +
1
σ
μ4,t+1 = 0 (36)
πt : wππt + μ4,t+1 − μ4,t −
1
σβ
μ5,t = 0 (37)
yt : −(σ + φ)ot − λ(σ + φ)μ4,t+1 + μ5,t+1 −
1
β
μ5,t = 0 (38)
Comparing these foc with those of nature, (33) and (34), we immediately see that μ4,t =
ˆ μ4,t and μ5,t =ˆ μ5,t. Hence the worst-case equilibrium for this game can be written in
state-space form as
at+1 = ρaat +  a,t+1 (39)
et+1 = ρeet +  e,t+1 (40)
uC,t+1 = ρCuC,t +  C,t+1 (41)
μ4,t+1 = μ4,t +
1
σβ
+ μ5,t − wππt (42)
μ5,t+1 =
1
β
μ5,t + λ(σ + φ)μ4,t+1 +( σ + φ)ot (43)
βEtπt+1 = πt − λmct − et − ut+1 (44)
Etyt+1 = yt +
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 + EtuC,t+1 − uC,t) − vt+1 (45)
it = −
1
wiσ
μ4,t+1 (46)
mct =( σ + φ)yt − (1 + φ)at (47)
ut+1 = −
1
Θ
μ4,t+1 (48)
vt+1 = −
1
Θ
μ5,t+1 (49)
rt = it − Etπt+1 (50)
ˆ yt =
 
1+φ
σ + φ
 
at (51)
ot =ˆ yt − yt (52)
It is of interest to note that after eliminating μ5,t and μ4,t from (42) and (43), the
interest rate rule (46) can be expressed as
it =
 
(β +1 ) σ + λ(σ + φ)
σβ
 
it−1 −
1
β
it−2 −
1
wiσ
[(σ + φ)(ot − ot−1) − wπλ(σ + φ)πt]
so given {ut+1},{vt+1}, the interest rate adjusts gradually, responding negatively to Δot
and positively to πt.20
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The approximating equilibrium is the undisturbed model with the interest rate rule
designed for the worst case. This is given by
βEtπa
t+1 = πa
t − λmca
t − et (53)
Etya
t+1 = ya
t +
1
σ
(it − Etπa
t+1 + EtuC,t+1 − uC,t) (54)
mca
t =( σ + φ)ya
t − (1 + φ)at (55)
ra
t = it − Etπa
t+1 (56)
ˆ yt =
 
1+φ
σ + φ
 
at (57)
oa
t =ˆ yt − ya
t (58)
where the interest rate rule is given by (46) in the worst-case equilibrium. An immediate
problem with this solution of the approximating equilibrium now emerges: it cannot be
saddle-path stable and in fact it is stable, but indeterminate. We return to this problem
in the context of our preferred game 2. Table 2 displays the properties of the worst-case
equilibrium as Θ decreases and the concern for robustness increases.
Θ=∞ Θ = 100 Θ=5 0 Θ=2 5 Θ=2 0
var(ot) 1.91 2.25 2.68 4.08 5.25
var(πt) 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08
var(yt) 2.95 3.29 3.73 5.13 6.29
var(lt) 2.05 2.39 2.82 4.22 5.39
var(rt) 2.15 2.38 2.65 3.44 4.02
var(it) 2.40 2.66 2.98 3.89 4.56
Prob. ZLB 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.32
Ω0 4.286 5.030 5.990 9.020 11.53
ce(Θ)(%) 0 0.007 0.017 0.047 0.072
Table 2. worst-case Equilibrium in Game 1
Note: ce is the consumption-equivalent cost of robustness as a percentage of steady state
consumption.21
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In Table 2 we deﬁne ce(Θ) as the cost of planning for the worst case scenario compared
with just designing a rule for the approximating model. Let the expected loss in the general
case of Θ  = ∞ be Ω0(Θ). Then in percentage terms we have that
ce(Θ) = (Ω0(Θ) − Ω0(∞)) × 10−2 (59)
Three main results emerge from Table 2. First as concern for robustness increases then so
do the volatilities of all variables in the economy under the robust rule increase, including
that of the nominal interest rate. Thus in contrast to the result of Brainard (1967), the
robust rule responds more aggressively in this environment of unstructured uncertainty
than in the case of no model uncertainty. Second, the welfare cost associated with the
worst-case compared to optimal policy without uncertainty rises as Θ falls to ce =0 .072
when Θ = 20. Finally robust control has a further cost: the frequency of hitting the ZLB
increases from just over a quarter with the unrobust rule to almost one third with the
robust rule and Θ = 20.
3.4.2 Robust Control: Game 2
Consider now the design of a robust rule by the monetary authority given (35) and the
perturbed model (60) where ut+1 and vt+1 are given by (35). We can write the worst-case
perturbed model in state-space form as
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
zt+1
ut+1
vt+1
Etxt+1
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
= A∗(Θ)
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
zt
ut
vt
xt
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
+ B∗it + C∗
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣
 a,t+1
 e,t+1
 C,t+1
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎦
(60)
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
yt
lt
rt
ot
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
= F
⎡
⎣
zt
xt
⎤
⎦ (61)
Optimized robust rules can now be found using the same method as for optimized rules
without uncertainty.
The approximating equilibrium is again given by (53)-(58) as before and again is not
saddle-path stable. However we can remedy this feature in a simple way. By modifying22
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the policymaker’s loss function
(1 − ω)Wt + ωWa
t =( 1− ω)((σ + φ)o2
t + wππ2
t)+ω((σ + φ)oa2
t + wππa2
t )+wii2
t
a small value of ω imposes a concern for stability of the approximating equilibrium and
makes the composite worst-case, approximating model saddle-path stable. Then in the
f o l l o w i n gt a b l et oc o m p a r et h eo u t c o m ew i t ht h ep r e v i o u sg a m ew et a k eω =0f o rt h e
worst-case equilibrium and ω =0 .1 to calculate the approximating equilibrium.
Θ=∞ Θ = 100 Θ=5 0 Θ=2 5 Θ=2 0
var(ot) 1.91 2.35 2.80 3.51 3.72
var(oa
t) 1.91 2.08 2.10 1.76 1.51
var(πt) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
var(πa
t ) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.20
var(yt) 2.95 3.39 3.84 4.55 4.76
var(ya
t ) 2.95 3.12 3.14 2.80 2.56
var(lt) 2.05 2.49 2.94 3.65 3.86
var(la
t ) 2.05 2.21 2.24 1.90 1.66
var(rt) 2.15 2.61 2.93 3.20 3.94
var(ra
t ) 2.15 2.45 2.73 2.79 2.80
var(it) 2.40 2.83 3.08 3.37 4.39
Prob. ZLB 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.32
Ω0(Θ) 4.286 4.983 5.737 7.254 8.007
Ωa
0(Θ) 4.286 4.347 4.423 5.674 7.345
ce (%) 0 0.007 0.014 0.030 0.037
ca
e (%) 0 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.031
Table 3. Robust Control in Game 2 (Commitment)
From Table 3 by comparing the expected welfare loss Ω0(Θ) with that in Table 2 we
see immediately the sub-optimal nature of the policymaker’s response to nature in game
2. The cost of achieving robustness, ce is now almost half that of game 2 at when concern
for robustness is set at Θ = 20. The cost in the approximating equilibrium rises to a23
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similar level. As in game 1, the frequency of hitting the ZLB rises as the rule becomes
more robust.
Figure 2, as with Figure 1, shows the impulse response to a mark-up shock but now
compares optimal policy without model uncertainty with the robust control worst-case and
approximating equilibria. In the worst-case equilibrium, nature adds to the inﬂationary
pressures resulting in the hump-shape as the eﬀect of the mark-up shock declines. In
anticipation of this malign intervention, interest rate policy is more active than the non-
robust policy in the absence of model uncertainty, rising by more in the short-run and
falling by more in the medium term. This adds to the volatility of the interest rate seen
as a feature when all shocks are included as in Table 3. In the approximating equilibrium
the output gap and other real variables including the expected real interest rate, rt =
it − Etπt+1 are almost the same for the approximating equilibrium and the model under
non-robust optimal control without model uncertainty. As rt returns to its steady state of
zero the expected inﬂation rate in the approximating equilibrium must therefore follow the
interest rate path designed for the worst-case equilibrium and fall well below zero before
gradually returning to the steady state. The approximating equilibrium then experiences
a much lower volatility of the output gap but a much higher volatility of inﬂation for this
shock, a feature again seen for all shocks in Table 3. In the welfare loss the former eﬀect
slightly outweighs the latter as can be seen from Ω0(Θ)a < Ω0(Θ) in Table 3.
As with optimal policy without model uncertainty, we now ask the question: can an
optimized simple Taylor-type rule mimic the fully optimal policy? We require a rule that
is saddle-path stable for both the worst-case and approximating models. 7A rule of the
form (17) will achieve saddle-path stability of the latter but not the former. This requires
an conventional Taylor-type rule that responds to nature’s malign misspeciﬁcation errors:
i.e.,
it = ρit−1 + θππt + θy(yt − ˆ yt)+θuut+1 + θvvt+t
where ut+1 and vt+1 is given by (35). Note that since, in our complete information frame-
work, we are assuming that the current inﬂation rate and the output gap is observable at
time t, ut+1 and vt+1 as functions of outcomes [ot,o t−1, ··; πt,π t−1, ·· ] can be calculated
7If one is only interested in deterministic impulse responses this is not a requirement as the numerical
solution as a two-point boundary value problem can still be computed. Our stochastic problem however
does require staddle-path stability.24
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Θ=∞ Θ = 100 Θ=5 0 Θ=2 5 Θ=1 5
[ρ, θπ,θ y, [1.0,8.96,0.06, [0.91,8.21,0.22, [0.64,10.0,0.42, [0.48,10.0,0.0 [0.47,10.0,0.0.
θu,θ v] 0,0] 5.86,10.0] 7.13,10.0] 7.16,6.37] 6.27,5.35]
var(ot) 1.98 2.21 2.77 3.46 3.79
var(oa
t) 1.98 1.86 2.13 2.26 2.27
var(πt) 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.07
var(πa
t ) 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
var(yt) 2.93 3.16 3.76 4.51 4.86
var(ya
t ) 2.93 2.78 3.08 3.22 3.24
var(lt) 2.16 2.38 2.93 3.61 3.92
var(la
t ) 2.16 2.04 2.31 2.43 2.45
var(rt) 2.56 2.03 2.73 2.92 3.38
var(ra
t ) 2.56 1.64 2.37 2.74 2.81
var(it) 2.53 2.45 2.98 3.20 3.82
var(ia
t) 2.53 1.98 2.57 2.82 2.88
Prob. ZLB 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.31
Prob. ZLB (a) 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.28
Ω0(Θ) 4.356 5.330 5.859 7.4570 8.417
Ωa
0(Θ) 4.356 4.488 4.505 4.688 4.722
ce 0 0.010 0.015 0.031 0.041
ca
e 0 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004
Table 4. Robust Control in Game 2 with Optimized Taylor Rule:
it = ρit−1 + θππt + θy(yt − ˆ yt)+θuut+1 + θvvt+1
ia
t = ρia
t−1 + θππa
t + θy(ya
t − ˆ yt)+θuua
t+1 + θvva
t+125
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at time t and are also observable. The robust Taylor-type rule must therefore respond to
past realizations of the output gap and inﬂation and thereby loses an important feature
of such a rule, namely its simplicity.
Table 4 shows how the optimized rule changes as concern for robustness increases
and the outcomes under the rule. Regarding the former we see that the optimized rule
proceeds from an integral rule in the absence of model uncertainty to a rule with far
less interest-rate smoothing for the most robust case. The cost of robustness ce in the
worst-case equilibrium is rather higher than under the fully optimal rule, but interestingly
considerably lower in the approximating model. In a sense then, the simple rule is more
robust in that it trades a slightly worse performance in the worst-case equilibrium for a
much better outcome if the model is unperturbed. This is achieved by a rule that responds
to the observed current output gap and inﬂation rates in the worst-case scenario, ot and
πt, but to the observed counterparts oa
t =( ˆ yt−ya
t )a n dπa
t if the economy is not perturbed.
In the two states of the world, the rule takes the form
it = ρit−1 + θππt + θy(yt − ˆ yt)+θuut+1 + θvvt+1
Θut+1 =Θ
 
ut +
1
σβ
vt
 
+ wππt
Θvt+1 =Θ
 
1
β
vt + λ(σ + φ)ut+1
 
+( σ + φ)(yt − ˆ yt)
for the worst-case equilibrium, with the same rule responding to the undisturbed outcomes
ia
t = ρia
t−1 + θππt + θy(ya
t − ˆ yt)+θuua
t+1 + θvva
t+1
Θua
t+1 =Θ
 
ua
t +
1
σβ
va
t
 
+ wππa
t
Θva
t+1 =Θ
 
1
β
va
t + λ(σ + φ)ua
t+1
 
+( σ + φ)(ya
t − ˆ yt)
for the approximating model. This contrasts with the fully optimal policies that are
designed as the same interest rate path conditional on initial displacements for both the
worst-case and approximating equilibria.
3.4.3 Robust Control: Game 3
In our ﬁnal robustness game we consider the case where the policymaker cannot commit
and is forced to pursue a time consistent discretionary policy. Table 5 sets out the results
that correspond to the commitment case in Table 3.26
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Two features of these results are worth highlighting. First, in the case of a very high
setting of Θ we do not revert to the time consistent solution without model uncertainty
of Table 1 and in fact the outcome is considerable better than for that case. This result
highlights the point raised by Blake and Kirsanova (2007) that it is possible to have
multiple discretionary equilibria. In our case this second equilibrium arose because we
expanded the state-space to include worst-case misspeciﬁcation errors [ut,v t]. Even when
Θ →∞ , in which case these misspeciﬁcation errors are purely exogenous processes, the
higher-order state space creates a new Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Θ=∞ Θ = 100 Θ=5 0 Θ=2 5 Θ=2 0
var(ot) 1.89 2.40 2.98 4.17 4.72
var(oa
t) 1.89 2.97 2.90 2.33 2.03
var(πt) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02
var(πa
t ) 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02
var(yt) 2.93 3.44 4.03 5.21 5.76
var(ya
t ) 2.93 4.02 3.94 3.37 3.08
var(lt) 2.04 2.54 3.13 4.31 4.86
var(la
t ) 2.04 3.11 3.04 2.47 2.18
var(rt) 2.67 3.31 3.86 3.88 3.41
var(ra
t ) 2.67 2.69 3.12 3.34 3.22
var(it) 2.91 3.52 3.98 3.70 3.16
Prob. ZLB 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.29
Ω0(Θ) 4.436 5.220 6.097 7.991 9.042
Ωa
0(Θ) 4.436 7.313 6.293 4.538 4.484
ce 0.001 0.009 0.018 0.037 0.048
ca
e 0.001 0.030 0.020 0.003 0.002
Table 5. Robust Control in Game 3 (Discretion)
The second noteworthy feature of Table 5 concerns the costs of discretion when com-
bined with a concern for robustness. At Θ = 20, comparing Tables 3 and 5 we see that
commitment when combined with a concern for robustness raises welfare in the worst-case
equilibrium by a consumption equivalent of 0.048 − 0.037 = 0.011% which although still27
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small is signiﬁcantly higher than the commitment gain of ce =0 .007% reported in Table 1
without model uncertainty. This outcome is reached at a higher frequency of hitting the
interest rate ZLB constraint. The cost of discretion in the approximating equilibrium is
less clear cut as it rises for low levels of concern for robustness, reaches a peak somewhere
between Θ = 100 and Θ = 50 and then falls. This is an interesting phenomenon requiring
further investigation. But for low levels of concern for robustness, Table 5 suggests a new
result regarding commitment when combined with unstructured model uncertainty: that
robustness concerns increase the welfare gains from commitment.
4 Imposing the Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound
In one respect the modest consumption equivalent costs reported up to now are mis-
leading, especially for the discretionary policy. The reason for this is to be seen for the
unconditional variances reported in these which are very large and rise further when we
introduce robustness concerns. Such high variances imply that the interest rate under
these optimized or optimal rules will hit the interest rate zero lower bound frequently.8
We now address this design fault in the rules.
We modify our interest-rate rules to approximately impose an interest rate ZLB so that
this event hardly ever occurs. As in Woodford (2003), chapter 6, this is implemented by
increasing the weight on the interest rate variance wi in the single period welfare loss (12).
Then following Levine et al. (2007), the policymaker’s optimization problem is to choose
wi and the unconditional distribution for it (characterized by the steady state variance)
shifted to the right about a new non-zero steady state inﬂation rate and a higher nominal
interest rate, such that the probability, p, of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is
very low. This is implemented by calibrating the weight wi for each of our policy rules
so that z0(p)σr <R n where z0(p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed
variable Z such that prob (Z ≤ z0)=p, I = 1
β − 1+π∗ is the steady state nominal
interest rate, σ2
i =v a r ( i) is the unconditional variance and π∗ is the new steady state
inﬂation rate. Given σi, the steady state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure it ≥ 0
8As Primiceri (2006) has pointed out, optimal rules with this feature are ‘not operational’.28
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with probability 1 − p is given by9
π∗ =m a x [ z0(p)σr −
 
1
β
− 1
 
× 100,0] (62)
In our linear-quadratic framework we can now write the inter-temporal expected welfare
loss at time t = 0 as the sum of stochastic plus deterministic components, Ω0 = ˜ Ω0 + ¯ Ω0.
Given wi, denote the expected inter-temporal loss (stochastic plus deterministic compo-
nents) at time t =0b yΩ 0(wi). This includes a term penalizing the variance of the
interest rate which does not contribute to utility loss as such, but rather represents the
interest rate lower bound constraint. Actual utility, found by subtracting the interest rate
term, is given by Ω0(0). Since in the new steady state the real interest rate is unchanged,
the steady state involving real variables are also unchanged, so from (12) we can write
¯ Ω0(0) = 1
2wππ∗2. Both the ex-ante optimal and the optimal time-consistent deterministic
welfare loss that guide the economy from a zero-inﬂation steady state to π = π∗ diﬀer
from ¯ Ω0(0) (but not by much because the steady-state contributions by far outweighs the
transitional one).
By increasing wi we can lower σi thereby decreasing π∗ and reducing the deterministic
component, but at the expense of increasing the stochastic component of the welfare loss.
By exploiting this trade-oﬀ, we can optimize over wi and π∗ to then arrive at the optimal
policy that, in the vicinity of the steady state, imposes the ZLB constraint, it ≥ 0w i t h
probability 1 − p.
9If the ineﬃciency of the steady-state output is negligible, then π
∗ ≥ 0 is a credible new steady state
inﬂation rate. Note that in our LQ framework, the zero interest rate bound is very occasionally hit.
Then interest rate is allowed to become negative, possibly using a scheme proposed by Gesell (1934) and
Keynes (1936). Our approach to the ZLB constraint (following Woodford, 2003) in eﬀect replaces it with
a nominal interest rate variability constraint which ensures the ZLB is hardly ever hit. By contrast the
work of a number of authors including Adam and Billi (2007), Coenen and Wieland (2003), Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson (2006) study optimal monetary policy with commitment in the face
of a non-linear constraint it ≥ 0 which allows for frequent episodes of liquidity traps in the form of it =0 .29
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Rule Θ π∗ (%) Ω0 = ˜ Ω0(0) + ¯ Ω0(0) ce (%)
Optimal ∞ 0.08 5.4 0
Discretion ∞ 2.17 134 1.29
Optimal 50 0.66 29 0.24
Discretion 50 2.73 177 1.72
Table 6. Summary of Welfare Outcome of Rules in the Worst-Case
Equilibrium with a Nominal Interest Rate ZLB Imposed.
Figure 4 and Table 6 show the results of this optimization procedure for the optimal
commitment and discretionary rules respectively for the worst-case equilibrium. (Recall
that the latter refers to the case for which HS-robust rules are designed). We choose
p =0 .025. The steady-state inﬂation rate, π∗, that will ensure the lower bound is reached
only with probability p =0 .025 is computed using (62). Given π∗, we can then evaluate
the deterministic component of the welfare loss, ¯ Ω0(0).
Comparing Table 6 with a ZLB constraint with Tables 3 and 4 without the constraint
two results stand out: ﬁrst, without robustness concerns (Θ = ∞) the gains from commit-
ment rise substantially from a very small value of ce =0 .007% in Table 1 to the substantial
ce =1 .29% in Table 6. This conﬁrms the result obtained by Levine et al. (2007) using
an empirical DSGE model ﬁtted to Euro-data. Second, the ZLB constraint substantially
increases the cost of achieving robustness with commitment in the face of unstructured
uncertainty from ce =0 .014% in Table 3 to ce =0 .24% in Table 6, and from ce =0 .018%
in Table 5 to ce =1 .72% in Table 6 under discretion. The combination of worst-case
robustness, lack of commitment and the interest rate ZLB constraint creates a substan-
tial welfare cost equivalent to a 1.72% permanent increase in steady state consumption.
Finally, for the approximating equilibrium a very similar result holds because the steady
state inﬂation rate required to satisfy the ZLB constraint is so high under discretion and
is the same for the worst-case and approximating equilibria.30
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5 Robust Rules with Structured Model Uncertainty
5.1 A Rival Model Approach to Robustness
In this section we consider model uncertainty in the form of uncertain estimates of the
non-policy parameters of the model, Γ = (β,ξ,φ,σ,ζ,ρa,ρ e,ρ C,ζ,σ2
a,t,σ2
e,t,σ2
C,t). Suppose
the state of the world s is described by a model with Γ = Γs expressed in state-space form
as
⎡
⎣ zs
t+1
Etxs
t+1
⎤
⎦ = As
⎡
⎣ zs
t
xs
t
⎤
⎦ + Bsis
t + Cs
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣
 a,t+1
 e,t+1
 C,t+1
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎦
(63)
os
i = Es
⎡
⎣ zs
t
xs
t
⎤
⎦ (64)
where zs
t =[ as
t,e s
t,u s
C,t,i t−1] is a vector of predetermined variables at time t and xt =
[ys
t,πs
t] are non-predetermined variables in state s of the world. In (63) and (64) it is
important to stress that variables are in deviation form about a zero-inﬂation steady state
of the model in state s. For example output in deviation form is given by ys
t =
Y s
t −¯ Y s
¯ Ys where
¯ Y s is the steady state of the model in state s deﬁned by parameters Γs and is
t = it −¯ is
where the natural rate of interest in model s, ¯ is = 1
βs − 1.
Because each model is linearized about a possibly diﬀerent steady state, we must now
set up the model in state s in terms of the actual interest rate, not the deviation about
the steady state. Then augmenting the state vector to become zs
t =[ 1 ,a s
t,e s
t,u s
C,t,i t−1]w e
still have a state-space form (63) and (64) and we minimize
Ω0 =
1
2
∞  
t=0
βt
n  
s=1
ps[y 
tQyt +2 y 
tUit + Ri2
t] (65)
where ps is the weight or probability attached to model s. This we refer to as model-
robustness. 10
10A more stringent robustness criterion is to design rules that are parameter-robust. Then (65) is replaced
with the average expected utility loss across a large number of draws from all models constructed using
both the estimated posterior model probabilities and the posterior parameter distributions for each model
found by Bayesian estimation (see Batini et al. (2006) and Levine et al. (2008)) In this paper we conﬁne
ourselves to model-robustness.31
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With model uncertainty even in the absence of initial displacements z0, there is still a
deterministic component of policy arising from diﬀerences in the natural rate of interest
compatible with zero inﬂation in the steady state, ¯ is = 1
βs − 1. A non-integral rule
specifying it = ¯ is in the long-run will only result in zero inﬂation in model s. From the
consumers’ Euler equation in model r with βr >β s, implementing the rule designed for
model s with ¯ i = ¯ is = 1
βs − 1 gives a steady state inﬂation rate ¯ πr that is no longer zero
but given by
βr(1 +¯ is)
(1 + ¯ πr)
=
βr
βs(1 + ¯ πr)
= 1 i.e., ¯ πr =
βr
βs − 1 > 0 (66)
Our robust non-integral rule designed for any model speciﬁes a natural zero inﬂation rate
of interest ¯ iR, corresponding to a discount factor βR = 1
1+¯ iR to result in an expected
long-run inﬂation rate across models of zero. This implies βR is determined by
n  
s=1
ps
 
βs
βR
− 1
 
=0 ⇒ βR =
n  
s=1
psβs (67)
That is, βR is the expected value of βs across the model variants. The need to specify
a natural rate of interest, ¯ iR, only applies to non-integral rules. By contrast, a further
beneﬁt of integral rules is that the economy is automatically driven to a zero-inﬂation
steady state whatever the state of the world without having to specify ¯ iR.
As in section 4 we impose the ZLB constraint by varying the weight wi. For Bayesian-
robust commitment rules the interest rate volatility is not great and the shift in the steady
state inﬂation rate needed to impose the ZLB constraint is small (as can be conﬁrmed by
the Θ = ∞ results in Table 6). We therefore conﬁne ourselves to the case where steady-
state inﬂation is zero (π∗ =0 ) . F o re a c ho ft h en models, we calculate the equilibrium
steady state variance of the interest rate. Then for each draw we use the variance of the
interest rate to calculate the probability of hitting the zero lower bound; once again the
average of these appears as Prob ZLB in the table and the average of these is included in
the last row of tables 7 and 9 below as σ2
i . Thus with an equilibrium interest rate of 1%
per quarter (4% per annum), the latter are given by
σ2
i =
1
n
n  
j=1
σ2
i(j)
ProbZLB =
1
n
n  
j=1
Z
 
−
1
σi(j)
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where Z(x) is the probability that a standard normal random variable has a value less
than x.
5.2 Application to the Canonical Keynesian Model
We now apply this procedure to the canonical model. We limit the structural uncertainty
to the important parameter ξ that captures the degree of price stickiness in the model.
Other parameters remain unchanged, including β so that βR = β in (67). Four model
variants are considered with this parameter taking values ξ =0 .001, 1/2, 2/3, 3/4 corre-
sponding to near ﬂexible prices and an average price contract length of 2, 3a n d4q u a r t e r s
respectively. We consider optimal policy and a simple current inﬂation rule of the form
it = ρit−1 + θππt (68)
The form of the optimal commitment rule has been shown to take the form:
it =
 
(β +1 ) σ + λ(σ + φ)
σβ
 
it−1 −
1
β
it−2 −
1
wiσ
[(σ + φ)(ot − ot−1) − wπλ(σ + φ)πt]
= ρ1it−1 − ρ2it−2 − θΔo(ot − ot−1)+θππt (69)
say. Woodford (2003), page 584, describes this rule as ‘robustly optimal’ in the sense
that it is independent of the exogenous processes in the model. The coeﬃcients have the
property that ρ1 − ρ2 > 1 (the rule is ‘super-inertial’) and it satisﬁes the modiﬁed Taylor
principle for rules with inertia, that θπ > 1−ρ1+ρ2. Numerical values for [ρ1,ρ 2,θ Δo,θ π]
are given in table 7 for the 4 model variants with the M-robust rule in the ﬁnal row. Re-
garding the latter it is super-inertial and satisﬁes the Taylor principle. Moreover, unlike
the HS robust rule, the M-robust rule does not call for a more aggressive policy than any
of the non-robust rules, but neither does it exhibit the Brainard property that uncertainty
calls for more policy caution.33
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Rule ξ [ρ1,ρ 2,θ Δo,θ π] wi σ2
i ˜ Ω0(0)
OPT(1) 10−3 [1867, 1.01, 463, 461580] 0.004 0.24 0.0002
OPT(2) 1
2 [2.953, 1.01, 0.370, 0.187] 5 0.25 1.041
OPT(3) 2
3 [2.328, 1.01, 0.116, 0.020] 16 0.25 7.321
OPT(4) 3
4 [2.171, 1.01, 0.053, 0.005] 35 0.24 23.87
M-Robust Aggregate [2.161, 0.96, 0.055, 0.692] 15 0.25 7.56
Table 7. Optimal Commitment with π∗ =0and Interest Rate ZLB Imposed.11
Table 8 shows the welfare and ZLB outcomes when each rule designed for model i is
implemented in model j, i =1 ,···4, j =1 ,···4. These outcomes are compared with those
under the M-robust rule in the last row of table 7. The table shows that non-robustness
can take one of two forms. In the oﬀ-diagonal cells above the diagonal the welfare losses
are below the optimal values but at a cost of severe violations of the ZLB constraint. In the
most extreme case, the optimal rule for model 1 implemented in model 4 the probability
of hitting the ZLB is 0.41 per period and this is compensated by only a small reduction
of welfare loss. The other form of non-robustness shows itself in oﬀ-diagonal losses below
the diagonal which are substantially higher than the optimal values. Thus in the case of
the rule designed for model 4 implemented in model 2, the welfare loss is over three times
that of the optimal value with the compensation that the ZLB probability is almost zero.
The ﬁnal row of table 8 provides provides the cost of robustness analogous to (59).
For the M-robust rule this is deﬁned as follows. Let Ω0(i) be the minimum welfare loss
for model i under optimal policy designed for i.L e tΩ M
0 (i) be the welfare loss under the
M-robust rule given in the penultimate row. The M-robust optimal rule is obtained by
searching over rules of the form of (69), and ﬁnding the lowest average loss over all four
models. The cost of robustness is deﬁned by
ce =( Ω M
0 (i) − Ω0(i)) × 10−2
in consumption equivalent percentage units.
11For the M-robust rule in tables 7 and 9, σ
2
i and ˜ Ω0(0) are simple averages over the 4 model variants;
i.e., we put ps =
1
4 in (65).34
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Rule OPT(i) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OPT(1) 0.0002 0.6028 5.320 20.87
(0.021) (0.17) (0.33) (0.41)
OPT(2) 0.002 1.041 4.837 15.72
(0.000) (0.023) (0.17) (0.32)
OPT(3) 0.003 2.231 7.321 18.42
(0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.15)
OPT(4) 0.003 3.213 10.16 23.87
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021)
Robust Rule 0.001 1.462 7.335 21.442
(0.009) (0.006) (0.023) (0.064)
ce (%) 10−5 0.004 0.0001 −0.02
Table 8. Optimal Commitment with Model Uncertainty.
Note:O P T ( i) is the optimal rule designed for model i as given in Table 7. Cell ij con-
tains the welfare loss under OPT(i) in the model j. Values in brackets are ZLB violation
probabilities.
Model ξ Rule [ρ,θπ] wi σ2
i ˜ Ω0(0)
INF(1) 10−3 [1, 0.6203] 0.25 0.25 0.001
INF(2) 1
2 [1, 0.7618] 15 0.24 1.892
INF(3) 2
3 [1, 0.5653] 30 0.25 9.936
INF(4) 3
4 [1, 0.4280] 50 0.25 29.47
M-robust Aggregate [1, 0.5517] 25.5 0.25 9.909
Table 9. Optimal Current Inﬂation Rule with π∗ =0and Interest Rate ZLB
Imposed.
Tables 9 and 10 repeat this exercise for the optimized inﬂation rule of the form (68). A
number of features stand out. First unlike the HS robust rule, the M-robust rule does come
close to exhibiting the Brainard property that uncertainty calls for more policy caution35
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in that the robust rule is less aggressive than all but the ﬁnal non-robust rule. Second,
examining the oﬀ-diagonal welfare losses and ZLB probabilities in table 10, by comparison
with those for the optimal rule in table 8 they show far less variation. The proportional
drop in welfare below the diagonal are far less and indeed in many cells the absolute
welfare loss for the optimized (but sub-optimal) simple rule are less than their ‘optimal’
counterparts. Above the diagonal the ZLB constraint violations are far less serious than
the optimal rule. As with the latter a robust rule can be designed that on average across
models satisﬁes the ZLB constraint and reduces the welfare loss variations. As in (59) we
calculate the cost of robustness in the ﬁnal row and here we see that these costs are very
similar to (and in fact slightly greater than) those for the optimal counterpart in Table 8.
We conclude that simple rules designed for one model implemented in the wrong model
are far more robust than the optimal counterpart. However when both types of rules are
designed to M-robust, the penultimate rows of tables 8 and 10 indicate that the costs of
robustness for the optimal rules are slightly lower.
Rule Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
INF(1) 0.001 2.214 9.532 26.13
(0.023) (0.013) (0.030) (0.064)
INF(2) 0.001 1.892 8.678 24.36
(0.029) (0.021) (0.05) (0.093)
INF(3) 0.002 2.374 9.936 26.95
(0.021) (0.011) (0.023) (0.053)
INF(4) 0.002 2.908 11.21 29.47
(0.011) (0.004) (0.009) (0.025)
M-Robust 0.002 2.418 10.05 27.17
(0.019) (0.009) (0.023) (0.051)
ce (%) 10−5 0.005 0.001 −0.02
Table 10. Optimal Current Inﬂation Rule with Model Uncertainty.
Note:I N F ( i) is the optimized current inﬂation rule designed for model i.C e l l ij con-
tains the welfare loss under INF(i) in the model j. Values in brackets are ZLB violation
probabilities.36
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have carried out two robust policy exercises for interest rate rules using
a work-horse New Keynesian model, one following a HS minimax approach with unstruc-
tured model uncertainty, and the other adopting an older tradition where model uncer-
tainty is structures and takes the form of rival models.
For the HS approach a number of results are worth highlighting. First, robust policy
in this case calls for a more aggressive monetary response to shocks than in the absence
of model uncertainty. This is not a new result (see, for example, Giannoni (2002) and
Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001)), but we pursue an important consequence of this
feature that has not appeared in the literature. A high interest rate variability in both
the worst-case and approximating equilibria means that, in both scenarios, the robust rule
leads to a serious violation of the ZLB constraint. The latter can be taken into account
by choosing a steady state inﬂation rate suﬃciently large, but then the costs of achieving
robustness are substantial.
Second, HS robust control can be seen as a non-cooperative game between malign
nature and the policymaker. As in any game, the equilibrium concept needs close atten-
tion. In Hansen and Sargent (2003) and most applications of HS, the latter is an open-loop
Nash equilibrium. We argue that this is not always a minimax solution as the policymaker
who can commit can do better in the face of the worst environment by anticipating na-
ture’s strategy and acting as a leader in a time-inconsistent Stackelberg game. However if
commitment is not possible and the policymakers exercises discretion, the worst-case equi-
librium deteriorates sharply and with it the cost of robustness. The corresponding result
for the approximating equilibrium is less straightforward in that we have found that as a
concern for robustness increases, the cost under discretion is hump-shaped, an interesting
result that merits further research. Taking these two points together, a combination of
an inability to commit and the ZLB constraint imposes a substantial welfare cost mainly
driven by a high steady state inﬂation rate for both the worst-case and approximating
equilibria. But even if commitment is possible, the high volatility of the interest rate and
the ZLB constraint results in a high cost of achieving HS robustness.
Finally, in the context of the time-inconsistent Stackelberg game, we examined Taylor-
type HS-robust rules that mimic the optimal commitment rule. We ﬁnd they take an37
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unconventional form in that to be saddle-path stable for both the worst-case and approx-
imating models they must ‘prepare for the worst’ in that they respond to nature’s malign
anticipated worst-case misspeciﬁcation errors.
The HS approach to robustness is a very powerful and elegant tool for a broad class of
economic decision-making. However for monetary policy design our results have raised a
number of question marks. HS robust control is appropriate if little information is available
on the underlying uncertainty facing the policymaker, originating from the model or the
manner in which agents form expectations. But is this really the case with respect to
the eﬀect of particular monetary rules on the macro-economy? Central banks devote
considerable resources to this end in their assessment of the forecasting properties of the
approximating model, those of rival models and estimates of parameter uncertainty gleaned
from various estimation methods. The Bayesian approach set out in the ﬁnal section of the
paper, and developed further in Levine et al. (2008), attempts to fully utilize the fruits
of this activity. Again we incorporate a ZLB constraint in construction of our robust
rules, but in notable contrast with HS robustness the Bayesian approach does not result
in aggressive monetary responses to shocks and a high interest rate volatility.
In our Bayesian exercise we have conﬁned ourselves to a very simple form of structured
uncertainty in the form of uncertainty surrounding an important parameter capturing the
degree of price stickiness. We have compared a robust interest rate rule of the form that
is optimal in the absence of any model uncertainty, with a simple rule feeding back on
current inﬂation. We ﬁnd that simple rules designed for one model implemented in the
wrong model are far more robust than its optimal counterpart, in the sense that the
proportional increase in welfare loss and violations of the ZLB constraint are far less.
This in a sense is an additional argument for simple rules to be considered alongside their
transparency and ease of implementation. When both types of rules are designed to be
robust across the possible views of the world, they perform similarly, so simple rules still
remain attractive. This exercise then suggests that some types of rule may be more robust
than others and robust design using a Bayesian approach should investigate a range of
rules with that in mind.38
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A Details of Policy Rules
First consider the purely deterministic problem. In general policy involving several (for
example monetary and ﬁscal) instruments starts with a model in state-space form:
⎡
⎣
zt+1
xe
t+1,t
⎤
⎦ = A
⎡
⎣
zt
xt
⎤
⎦ + Bwt (A.1)
where zt is an (n − m) × 1 vector of predetermined variables including non-stationary
processed, z0 is given, wt is a vector of policy variables, xt is an m × 1 vector of non-
predetermined variables and xe
t+1,t denotes rational (model consistent) expectations of
xt+1 formed at time t.T h e nxe
t+1,t = xt+1 and letting y 
t =[ z 
t x 
t] (A.1) becomes
yt+1 = Ayt + Bwt (A.2)
Deﬁne target variables st by
st = Myt + Hwt (A.3)
and the policy-maker’s loss function at time t by
Ωt =
1
2
∞  
i=0
βt[s 
t+iQ1st+i + w 
t+iQ2wt+i]( A . 4 )
which we can rewrite as
Ωt =
1
2
∞  
i=0
βt[y 
t+iQyt+i +2 y 
t+iUwt+i + w 
t+iRwt+i]( A . 5 )
where Q = M Q1M, U = M Q1H, R = Q2+H Q1H, Q1 and Q2 are symmetric and non-
negative deﬁnite, R is required to be positive deﬁnite and β ∈ (0,1) is discount factor. The
procedures for evaluating the three policy rules are outlined in the rest of this appendix
(or Currie and Levine (1993) for a more detailed treatment).
A.1 The Optimal Policy with Commitment
Consider the policy-maker’s ex-ante optimal policy at t = 0. This is found by minimizing
Ω0 given by (A.5) subject to (A.2) and (A.3) and given z0. We proceed by deﬁning the
Hamiltonian
Ht(yt,y t+1,μ t+1)=
1
2
βt(y 
tQyt +2 y 
tUwt + w 
tRwt)+μt+1(Ayt + Bwt − yt+1)( A . 6 )41
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where μt is a row vector of costate variables. By standard Lagrange multiplier theory we
minimize
L0(y0,y 1,...,w 0,w 1,...,μ 1,μ 2,...)=
∞  
t=0
Ht (A.7)
with respect to the arguments of L0 (except z0 which is given). Then at the optimum,
L0 =Ω 0.
Redeﬁning a new costate column vector pt = β−tμ 
t, the ﬁrst-order conditions lead to
wt = −R−1(βB pt+1 + U yt)( A . 8 )
βA pt+1 − pt = −(Qyt + Uwt)( A . 9 )
Substituting (A.8) into (A.2)) we arrive at the following system under control
⎡
⎣ Iβ B R −1B 
0 β(A  − UR−1B )
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ yt+1
pt+1
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ A − BR−1U  0
−(Q − UR−1U ) I
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ yt
pt
⎤
⎦ (A.10)
To complete the solution we require 2n boundary conditions for (A.10). Specifying z0
gives us n−m of these conditions. The remaining condition is the ‘transversality condition’
lim
t→∞
μ 
t = lim
t→∞
βtpt = 0 (A.11)
and the initial condition
p20 = 0 (A.12)
where p 
t =[ p 
1t p 
2t] is partitioned so that p1t is of dimension (n − m) × 1. Equation
(A.3), (A.8), (A.10) together with the 2n boundary conditions constitute the system under
optimal control.
Solving the system under control leads to the following rule
wt = −F
⎡
⎣ I 0
−N21 −N22
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ zt
p2t
⎤
⎦ ≡ D
⎡
⎣ zt
p2t
⎤
⎦ = −F
⎡
⎣ zt
x2t
⎤
⎦ (A.13)
where
⎡
⎣ zt+1
p2t+1
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ I 0
S21 S22
⎤
⎦G
⎡
⎣ I 0
−N21 −N22
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ zt
p2t
⎤
⎦ ≡ H
⎡
⎣ zt
p2t
⎤
⎦ (A.14)
N =
⎡
⎣ S11 − S12S−1
22 S21 S12S−1
22
−S−1
22 S21 S−1
22
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ N11 N12
N21 N22
⎤
⎦ (A.15)42
ECB
Working Paper Series No 899
May 2008
xt = −
 
N21 N22
 
⎡
⎣
zt
p2t
⎤
⎦ (A.16)
where F = −(R + B SB)−1(B SA+ U ),G= A − BF and
S =
⎡
⎣ S11 S12
S21 S22
⎤
⎦ (A.17)
partitioned so that S11 is (n − m) × (n − m)a n dS22 is m × m is the solution to the
steady-state Ricatti equation
S = Q − UF − F U  + F RF + β(A − BF) S(A − BF) (A.18)
The cost-to-go for the optimal policy (OP) at time t is
ΩOP
t = −
1
2
(tr(N11Zt)+t r ( N22p2tp 
2t)) (A.19)
where Zt = ztz 
t. To achieve optimality the policy-maker sets p20 =0a tt i m et =0 . A t
time t>0 there exists a gain from reneging by resetting p2t =0 . I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
N11 < 0a n dN22 < 0.12, so the incentive to renege exists at all points along the trajectory
of the optimal policy. This is the time-inconsistency problem.
A.1.1 Implementation
The rule may also be expressed in two other forms: First as
wt = D1zt + D2H21
t  
τ=1
(H22)τ−1zt−τ (A.20)
where D =[ D1 D2] is partitioned conformably with zt and p2t. The rule then consists
of a feedback on the lagged predetermined variables with geometrically declining weights
with lags extending back to time t = 0, the time of the formulation and announcement of
the policy.
The ﬁnal way of expressing the rule is express the process for wt in terms of the target
variables only, st, in the loss function. This in particular eliminates feedback from the
exogenous processes in the vector zt. Since the rule does not require knowledge of these
12See Currie and Levine (1993), chapter 5.43
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processes to design, Woodford (2003) refers to this as “robust” in describing it as the
Robust Optimal Explicit rule.
A.1.2 Optimal Policy from a Timeless Perspective
Noting from (A.16) that long the optimal policy we have xt = −N21zt − N22p2t,t h e
optimal policy “from a timeless perspective” proposed by Woodford (2003) replaces the
initial condition for optimality p20 =0w i t h
Jx0 = −N21z0 − N22p20 (A.21)
where J is some 1 × m matrix. Typically in New Keynesian models the particular choice
of condition is π0 = 0 thus avoiding any once-and-for-all initial surprise inﬂation. This
initial condition applies only at t = 0 and only aﬀects the deterministic component of
policy and not the stochastic, stabilization component.
A.2 The Dynamic Programming Discretionary Policy
The evaluate the discretionary (time-consistent) policy we rewrite the cost-to-go Ωt given
by (A.5) as
Ωt =
1
2
[y 
tQyt +2 y 
tUwt + w 
tRwt + βΩt+1] (A.22)
The dynamic programming solution then seeks a stationary solution of the form wt =
−Fzt in which Ωt is minimized at time t subject to (1) in the knowledge that a similar
procedure will be used to minimize Ωt+1 at time t +1 .
Suppose that the policy-maker at time t expects a private-sector response from t +1
onwards, determined by subsequent re-optimization, of the form
xt+τ = −Nt+1zt+τ,τ≥ 1 (A.23)
The loss at time t for the ex ante optimal policy was from (A.19) found to be a
quadratic function of xt and p2t. We have seen that the inclusion of p2t was the source of
the time inconsistency in that case. We therefore seek a lower-order controller
wt = −Fzt (A.24)44
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with the cost-to-go quadratic in zt only. We then write Ωt+1 = 1
2z 
t+1St+1zt+1 in (A.22).
This leads to the following iterative process for Ft
wt = −Ftzt (A.25)
where
Ft =( Rt + λB
 
tSt+1Bt)−1(U
 
t + βB
 
tSt+1At)
Rt = R + K 
tQ22Kt + U2TKt + K 
tU2
Kt = −(A22 + Nt+1A12)−1(Nt+1B1 + B2)
Bt = B1 + A12Kt
Ut = U1 + Q12Kt + J 
tU2 + J 
tQ22Jt
Jt = −(A22 + Nt+1A12)−1(Nt+1A11 + A12)
At = A11 + A12Jt
St = Qt − UtFt − F 
tU
  + F
 
tRtFt + β(At − BtFt) St+1(At − BtFt)
Qt = Q11 + J 
tQ21 + Q12Jt + J 
tQ22Jt
Nt = −Jt + KtFt
where B =
⎡
⎣ B1
B2
⎤
⎦, U =
⎡
⎣ U1
U2
⎤
⎦, A =
⎡
⎣ A11 A12
A21 A22
⎤
⎦,a n dQ similarly are partitioned
conformably with the predetermined and non-predetermined components of the state vec-
tor.
The sequence above describes an iterative process for Ft, Nt,a n dSt starting with some
initial values for Nt and St. If the process converges to stationary values, F,N and S say,
then the time-consistent feedback rule is wt = −Fzt with loss at time t given by
ΩTC
t =
1
2
z 
tSzt =
1
2
tr(SZt) (A.26)
A.3 Optimized Simple Rules
We now consider simple sub-optimal rules of the form
wt = Dyt = D
⎡
⎣ zt
xt
⎤
⎦ (A.27)45
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where D is constrained to be sparse in some speciﬁed way. Rule (A.27) can be quite
general. By augmenting the state vector in an appropriate way it can represent a PID
(proportional-integral-derivative)controller.
Substituting (A.27) into (A.5) gives
Ωt =
1
2
∞  
i=0
βty 
t+iPt+iyt+i (A.28)
where P = Q + UD+ D U  + D RD. The system under control (A.1), with wt given by
(A.27), has a rational expectations solution with xt = −Nzt where N = N(D). Hence
y 
tPyt = z 
tTzt (A.29)
where T = P11 − N P21 − P12N + N P22N, P is partitioned as for S in (A.17) onwards
and
zt+1 =( G11 − G12N)zt (A.30)
where G = A + BD is partitioned as for P. Solving (A.30) we have
zt =( G11 − G12N)tz0 (A.31)
Hence from (A.32), (A.29) and (A.31) we may write at time t
ΩSIM
t =
1
2
z 
tVz t =
1
2
tr(VZ t) (A.32)
where Zt = ztz 
t and V satisﬁes the Lyapunov equation
V = T + H VH (A.33)
where H = G11 − G12N.A t t i m e t = 0 the optimized simple rule is then found by
minimizing Ω0 given by (A.32) with respect to the non-zero elements of D given z0 using
a standard numerical technique. An important feature of the result is that unlike the
previous solution the optimal value of D, D∗ say, is not independent of z0.T h a ti st os a y
D∗ = D∗(z0)
A.4 The Stochastic Case
Consider the stochastic generalization of (A.1)
⎡
⎣ zt+1
xe
t+1,t
⎤
⎦ = A
⎡
⎣ zt
xt
⎤
⎦ + Bwt +
⎡
⎣ ut
0
⎤
⎦ (A.34)46
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where ut is an n × 1 vector of white noise disturbances independently distributed with
cov(ut) = Σ. Then, it can be shown that certainty equivalence applies to all the policy
rules apart from the simple rules (see Currie and Levine (1993)). The expected loss at
time t is as before with quadratic terms of the form z 
tXzt =t r ( Xzt,Z 
t) replaced with
Et
 
tr
 
X
 
ztz 
t +
∞  
i=1
βtut+iu 
t+i
   
=t r
 
X
 
z 
tzt +
λ
1 − λ
Σ
  
(A.35)
where Et is the expectations operator with expectations formed at time t.
Thus for the optimal policy with commitment (A.19) becomes in the stochastic case
ΩOP
t = −
1
2
tr
 
N11
 
Zt +
β
1 − β
Σ
 
+ N22p2tp 
2t
 
(A.36)
For the time-consistent policy (A.26) becomes
ΩTC
t = −
1
2
tr
 
S
 
Zt +
β
1 − β
Σ
  
(A.37)
and for the simple rule, generalizing (A.32)
ΩSIM
t = −
1
2
tr
 
V
 
Zt +
β
1 − β
Σ
  
(A.38)
The optimized simple rule is found at time t = 0 by minimizing ΩSIM
0 given by (A.38).
Now we ﬁnd that
D∗ = D∗
 
z0z 
0 +
β
1 − β
Σ
 
(A.39)
or, in other words, the optimized rule depends both on the initial displacement z0 and on
the covariance matrix of disturbances Σ.47
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Figure 1: Optimal Policy without Model Uncertainty48
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